In this paper, we examine the role of market characteristics in explaining the much discussed phenomenon of growth in the number of banking institution branches over time, and the much less discussed phenomenon of decline in the size of the average branch. Using a panel data set that consists of over 2,000 markets observed from 1988 to 2004, we report a number of findings regarding the market characteristics that are associated with the number of branches (of both commercial banks and savings associations) in a market and the average employment size of those branches. We find that the number of market branches is positively associated with the rate of return that banks in the market are able to obtain on their interest-bearing assets, inversely related to state branching restrictions, inversely related to market concentration, and, in the case of urban markets, positively related to measures of traffic congestion. Several other findings are also reported.
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In this paper, we examine the role of market characteristics in explaining the much discussed phenomenon of growth in the number of banking institution branches over time, and the much less discussed phenomenon of decline in the size of the average branch. Using a panel data set that consists of over 2,000 markets observed from 1988 to 2004, we report a number of findings regarding the market characteristics that are associated with the number of branches (of both commercial banks and savings associations) in a market and the average employment size of those branches. We find that the number of market branches is positively associated with the rate of return that banks in the market are able to obtain on their interest-bearing assets, inversely related to state branching restrictions, inversely related to market concentration, and, in the case of urban markets, positively related to measures of traffic congestion. Several other findings are also reported.
Introduction
In many parts of the United States, it is hard not to notice the proliferation of bank branches. In Illinois, for example, the number of banking offices increased by about 66 percent between 1994 and 2006. 1 For the nation as a whole, the number of offices of commercial banks increased by a less impressive but still noteworthy 27 percent during the same period. At first glance, this proliferation of bank branches may seem surprising, given the well documented proliferation of automated teller machines (ATMs) and the advent of on-line banking. One might think that ATMs and on-line banking would serve as substitutes for the services offered at bank branches, thus reducing their numbers over time. 2 This, however, does not appear to have been the case, at least not to the degree necessary to overcome factors that, as we document below, are associated with an increase in branching. however, that, because the number of branches of savings associations declined substantially during this period, the increase in the number of branches of both types of institution combined (also presented in figure 1 ) came to only 12 percent during the period. Thus, one of the reasons for the often noted substantial rise in the number of commercial bank branches appears to have been a substitution of commercial bank branches for the branches of savings associations, either 1 See Rice and Davis (2007) .
2 For these reasons, Speigel, Gart, and Gart in 1996 predicted that banks would close significant numbers of branches in the future.
through acquisitions or by some other process. Urban and rural areas appear to have experienced similar trends, with branch growth only somewhat slower in rural areas.
3
Other factors likely played an important role over time in explaining this rise in the number of branches. Between 1988 and 2005 , the population of the United States increased by 21 percent, while real disposable personal income rose by nearly 66 percent. 4 Thus, population, and particularly real income, grew substantially faster than the rise in the number of branches (of both commercial banks and savings associations) over the period, and it is not unreasonable to expect that the increase in the demand for branch services associated with these trends would, all else equal, have had a substantial positive influence on the number of branches. Additional factors to be investigated in detail below may also have played an important role.
Another trend that is perhaps less apparent concerns the average size of bank branches, as and the average employment size of savings association branches was somewhat smaller in rural markets than in urban areas. 5 These trends over time suggest a possible connection between the 3 The number of commercial bank branches increased by 43 percent in urban areas and 27 percent in rural areas over this period, while the number of branches of commercial banks and savings associations combined increased by 13 percent in urban areas and 10 percent in rural areas. 4 Economic Report of the President, 2006, p.319. 5 To avoid distortions that may come from counting employees in the home office, establishments with more than 100 employees are excluded from these calculations. Urban markets here and throughout the paper are defined as rapid proliferation of bank branches over the period and changes in the nature of branch operations that resulted in fewer employees per branch.
In this paper, we investigate the extent and potential determinants of both of these phenomenon-the proliferation of bank branches and the reduction in branch size as measured by employment-using an extensive data set that covers over 2,000 local markets for the period from 1988 to 2004. Employing panel data estimation with both market and year fixed effects, we report evidence consistent with several hypotheses regarding the determinants of these phenomena. In the case of the number of branches in a defined local market, we find that market population, market per capita income, state-specific bank deregulation, market concentration, the return obtainable from deposit funds, and (in the case of urban markets) traffic congestion are all associated with the extent of branching in plausible ways. These same market characteristics, however, are not found to explain much of the change in branch size, probably because the change in branch size over time reflects predominantly the impact of technical innovations that are not easily measured. We do find, however, that markets experiencing above average growth in the number of branches experienced greater than average declines in the average employment size of their branches and offer possible explanations.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the literature relevant to bank branching, and section 3 discusses likely determinants of the number and size of branches (bank plus savings association). Section 4 presents the empirical model employed, while section 5 discusses data sources and variable measurement. Section 6 presents estimation results, and section 7 summarizes and concludes.
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, and rural markets are defined as labor market areas, which in most cases correspond to rural counties. Average bank branch employment size was calculated for 314 urban markets and 1844 rural markets for which data were available for each year. Because some defined markets lost representation of savings associations over the period, reported averages for savings associations are calculated for numbers of markets that declined over the period.
The Literature
While no paper to our knowledge has examined the issue of how the size of branches has changed over time, a few studies have examined aspects of the relationship between the number of bank branches and its determinants.
Two of the papers, Avery, et.al. (1999) and Damar (2007) , focus on the issue of how mergers are associated with subsequent changes in the number of branches in a market or, in the case of Avery, et al. (1999) , in a zip code area. Both papers employ the number of branches per population as the measure of branch intensity. Avery, et al., using data from the years 1975 to 1995, find that mergers of institutions with branch networks that overlap within a zip code area are associated with a reduction in offices per capita in that area. However, they find no such effect for out-of-market mergers or for mergers among institutions operating in the same market but not in the same zip code. Numerous characteristics of zip code areas or markets, such as personal income in the area, area population, and measures of concentration, are employed to control for other factors that may influence changes in branches per population over time.
Using a similar methodology, Damar (2007) examines the relationship between bank consolidations and subsequent changes in bank branches per population in markets in Turkey over the "post-crisis period" from 2001 to 2003. In addition to bank consolidation variables, the study employs changes in market concentration (variously derived), changes in market population, and changes in market GDP for statistical control. The study finds that consolidations involving failed institutions frequently resulted in reductions in the number of branches per population, but those involving healthy institutions were associated with increases in branching in the case of concentrated markets.
Focusing on the branching decisions of individual banks, Kim and Vale (2001) growth. We investigate the role of both of these factors in this study.
Potential Determinants of the Number and Size of Bank Branches
In what follows, we consider separately the likely determinants of the number of branches (bank plus savings association) in a market and the average size of branches in a market.
The number of market branches. We presume as a general proposition that banks seek more deposits in a market when the revenue obtained by investing the funds (adjusted for risk) exceeds the cost of obtaining those funds. More local deposits may be obtained either by offering higher deposit rates and/or by providing the depositor with more convenience by means of a larger branch network, and profit maximization requires that in equilibrium, subject to qualifications, the incremental cost of obtaining local deposits through rate setting and branching should equate. An important qualification concerns the response of competitors to changes in deposit rates vs. changes in branch network. Since our focus is only on the total number of branches in a market, we will be concerned only with whatever equilibrium results from these competitive interactions among market participants.
These considerations lead us to predict a number of relationships between observable time-varying characteristics of markets and the number of market branches. First, and perhaps most trivially, the number of branches should increase with the population of the market. Of course, it would be possible to accommodate an increase in population with the same number of branches, each handling more depositors. But an increase in population is likely to entail a disproportionate increase in depositor locations that are less fully served by the existing branch network, and at the margin, the establishment of new branches should be less costly and/or more effective than raising deposit rates as a means of attracting deposits from those depositor locations. Diseconomies of scale at the branch level and increases in travel costs resulting from an increase in population would be additional reasons for a positive relationship between population and the number of market branches.
To the extent that it is a proxy for the value placed on travel time to the branch, income per capita should be positively related to the number of branch locations offered by banks.
Greater value placed on travel time by depositors would change the optimal mix of deposit rates and branch network in favor of the convenience of branch networks as a means of attracting deposit dollars. However, this effect may be tempered by the fact that people with higher incomes have more non-bank investment options available to them, thus reducing their demand for banking products below what they would otherwise be.
Because deposits are sought by banks to obtain income from investing the funds, any exogenous increase in the return obtainable from those funds should induce banks to seek more deposits. This should in turn induce banks to offer higher deposit rates and offer depositors greater convenience through an expansion of branch networks. This potential determinant of branching has been argued to be quite important during isolated periods of extreme financial distress. Damar (2007 ) notes, for example, that in an era of high budget deficits and inflation that existed in Turkey in the 1990s, banks found it profitable to collect deposits from the public and invest them in government securities bearing high real interest rates. Consequently, Turkish banks during the period expanded their branch networks rapidly to levels that were ultimately unsustainable. In contrast, after the banking difficulties in the late 1980s and 1990s, the rate of An explicit measure of traffic congestion, which will be employed for an urban subsample of banking markets, has a much less ambiguous prediction. It should be positively associated with the number of bank branches in the urban area, for reasons that are fundamental to spatial economics. By increasing the depositor's travel cost of moving a unit of distance to a branch, an increase in traffic congestion implies an increase in the optimal number (and more loosely, should result in an increase in the actual number) of market branches.
Banking markets may also differ in the degree to which they experience in-migration of new depositors. If it were not for switching costs, whereby depositors become "locked in" once they establish a relationship with a bank, this would presumably make no difference to a bank's pricing and branching decisions. With switching costs an important factor, however, the longterm payoff of attracting a new depositor entering the market becomes greater, inducing banks to offer more attractive deposit rates and, conceivably, more branch locations in markets that experience greater in-migration of depositors. Indeed, since convenient branch locations may be more readily observable to the in-migrating new depositor than an attractive deposit rate, and since branches probably represent more of a long-term commitment than does an attractive deposit rate (which can be rescinded at any time), the phenomenon of in-migration may be more important to bank branching decision than it is to the more commonly studied pricing decision. ATMs to substitute for tellers should reduce the size of branches, as measured by the number of employees. The recognition by banks that customers can be attracted through the placing of very small branch operations in supermarkets can also be considered a technological change, broadly defined, and this phenomenon may be significant in accounting for the observed decrease in branch size over time.
Because we cannot measure underlying technological change, we will not be able to
account empirically for what we consider to be the primary reason for the observed change in branch size over time. We do note, however, that, to the extent the technological change at issue is embodied disproportionately in newly opened branches, then one might predict that any market characteristic noted above as influencing the number of branches would thereby influence the observed size of branches in the opposite direction (since the newer branches would presumably be the smaller ones). While the recent placements of smaller branches in supermarkets most closely fits this notion that the newer branches should be smaller, it is not clear that other types of change, such as technologically-induced improvements in the coordination of branch operations or the placement of automated teller machines in branches, are likely to be embodied disproportionately in new branches.
The Empirical Model
In specifying the relationship between the number of branches in a market and likely determinants, previous researchers have employed only a linear functional form, which, before dividing through by market population, may be in our case expressed as: 
where inc mt denotes total personal income in market m at year t (in real terms), and all other terms are as previously defined. would imply that it is change in real income in the market, whether it stems from a change in population or a change in income per capita, that influences bank branching.
As noted above, we also examine the determinants of branch size over time, using the same explanatory variables. In log form, this relationship may be expressed as: 
where brsize mt denotes the average branch size in the market (to be measured in terms of employment), and all other terms are as previously defined.
The Data
Of the variables employed in the analysis, the number of branches, market population, were constructed from data on branch deposits obtained from the SOD and the BOS. To express income in real terms, market personal income is adjusted for changes in the consumer price index. The deregulation variable (dereg) is defined as a binary variable that receives the value of one if, during the year observed, the market is in a state (or predominantly in a state) that allowed full intrastate branching. The data employed to construct this variable were obtained form Kroszner and Strahan (1999) , with updates by the authors.
We have argued that the rate that banks can earn with deposit dollars should influence the extent to which they seek to obtain deposit dollars through branching. The question arises as to whether that rate should be a marginal or an average rate. If it is the marginal rate that matters (implying, under some circumstances, separability between the asset and liability side of the bank), then it is generally presumed that this would be the same for all banks, as banks set rates according to some elastically supplied asset or liability obtainable in a market that is at least national in scope. 10 In this case, the effect of this consideration would be reflected fully in the coefficients of the time dummies included in the analysis.
If it is the average rate that matters, however, then banks may differ cross-sectionally in terms of the impact that this consideration has on their branching decisions. To investigate this, we calculate an average rate observed for banks operating in a market (assetrate). This is obtained by calculating, for each bank, the ratio of interest income to the sum of interest bearing assets, using annual data from bank reports of condition and income. After eliminating likely outliers by dropping the largest and smallest one percent of observations for each year, these bank-specific rates were aggregated to the market level by constructing a market weighted average, using bank deposit shares as the weights. In other words, each bank-specific rate is multiplied by that bank's deposit share in the market, and this is summed across all banks in the market to obtain a rough estimate of the average rate obtainable with deposit funds on the part of banks that operate in the market. 11 As noted above, we also report results obtained without the inclusion of this variable.
Measures 11 This does imply that the rate obtainable by a multimarket bank, say Bankamerica, from investments outside the market help determine the extent to which it branches inside the market. Since deposits raised in one local area can be used to fund projects in another, we do not think that this is an unreasonable assumption. 12 Migration from one county to another county in the same defined market is excluded in these calculations. These data also allow calculation of the aggregate income of in-migrants, but this information was not collected prior to 1996.
Perhaps the most unusual measure to be employed in this study concerns the extent to 
The Results
Econometric results are presented separately for the number of market branches and for the average size of branches in the market.
The number of market branches. We consider first the relationship between the extent of branching in markets and various market characteristics, as discussed above. Table 1 lists the definitions of all variable employed in the analysis, while tables 2 and 3 present econometric results. All reported estimations include both market and year fixed effects, and all allow for non-zero correlation of errors for observations of the same market over time-a feature that results in higher standard errors (lower t-statistics) than would otherwise be obtained. All reported explanatory variables are lagged one year. Coefficient magnitudes suggest that for urban markets, a 10 percent increase in market population, all else equal, is associated with a 7 percent increase in the number of bank and savings association branches, while in rural markets, this figure would be closer to 5 percent.
The positive and highly significant coefficients of ln(y t-1 /pop t-1 ) indicates that, controlling
for market population, the income of consumers in the market has a substantial positive effect on the number of market branches. Coefficient magnitudes suggest that a 10 percent increase in market real per capita income would increase the number of market branches by 6 percent in urban markets, but only 2 percent in rural markets. suggesting that in such markets, it is market income rather than population that can be considered the more relevant measure of market size in explaining the number of market branches. 14 The coefficients of these two variables are statistically different from each other in the case of rural markets.
As indicated by the positive and highly significant coefficients of 1 t dereg − in all three regressions, state adoption of unrestricted statewide branching authority has had a substantial impact on the extent of branching. Coefficient magnitudes suggest that such authority is associated with about a 10 percent increase in the number of branches in urban markets and about a 5 percent increase in the number of branches in rural markets. These results are consistent with results reported by Rice and Davis (2007) for the state of Illinois, which experienced a virtual explosion in the number of branches after deregulation of its previously quite restrictive policies on bank branching.
The coefficients of ln(assetrate t-1 ) are also positive and highly significant in all three regressions, suggesting that more remunerative opportunities to invest deposit funds are associated with more subsequent branches in the market. Coefficient magnitudes suggest that over time, a 10 percent increase in the rate earned on interest bearing assets is associated with a 3 percent increase in the number of branches in urban markets and a 1 percent increase in the number of branches in rural market markets. As noted above, this phenomenon of asset returns driving branching decisions has shown itself to be quite important during certain periods of perverse financial conditions. As also noted above, inclusion of this variable is not appropriate if it is the marginal, rather than the average, return obtainable with deposit funds that influences bank branching decisions. Estimations that exclude this variable yield coefficients of the other variables in the analysis that are virtually the same as those reported here. To conserve space, those results are not presented but are available from the authors upon request.
The coefficients of ln(hhi t-1 ) are negative and highly significant in all three regressions, suggesting that high levels of market concentration are associated with lower levels of branching, all else equal. As noted above, conjectures regarding rival responses to deposit pricing and branching decisions are likely to play a major role in accounting for any observed relationship between market concentration and branching. The negative coefficients reported are consistent with the hypothesis that the greater recognized interdependence of branching decisions, as concentration increases, causes banking organizations to be less aggressive in establishing branches. The range at which this phenomenon is most likely to be relevant should entail higher levels of concentration, and it is interesting to note that the absolute value of this coefficient is greatest for rural markets, where levels of concentration are typically higher. The finding of negative coefficients of this variable may also reflect within-market mergers, which typically cause concentration to rise and often result in the subsequent closing of overlapping branches.
This finding of a negative relationship between market concentration and branching has also been reported recently by Rice and Davis (2007) .
The coefficients of ln(inmigration t-1 ) vary in sign and are all statistically insignificant.
Thus, we fail to find support in these regressions for the hypothesis that banks and savings associations are more aggressive in establishing branches in areas with a greater percentage of people who are new to the market.
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, the coefficient of ln(congest t-1 ) is positive and highly significant for the sample of 87 urban areas for which data on traffic congestion is available. The measure of congestion, defined as the annual delay (in hours) per peak traveler in the area, increased over time for almost all of these areas. With year fixed effects included, this result suggests that those urban areas that experienced above average increases in congestion exhibited above average increases in the number of branches. This result is consistent with basic predictions of spatial economics, which imply that as travel costs increase, the consumer will find closer locations relatively more desirable. In the case of the banking industry, this should induce banks to invest in more branches as a means of attracting depositors relative to other means of attracting them, such as by offering higher deposit rates.
It is conceivable, of course, that this finding reflects unmeasured changes in urban areas over time that are associated with both increased traffic congestion and increased branching. We note, however, that such market characteristics, if they exist, would have to be something other than market population or market personal income, both of which are controlled for in these regressions.
A couple of generalizations about the overall results presented in table 2 are worth noting. First, given that the first regression employs 318 markets, while the second employs 87, and the third employs 1,897, the similarity of coefficients (at least in sign) across these very diverse samples is quite striking, suggesting considerable robustness in underlying relationships.
Second, with the exception of the coefficient of concentration, which, as noted above, is subject to special considerations, the absolute values of coefficients tend to be smaller in the case of rural markets. This may be due to the fact that many rural markets have very few branches.
Because branches represent discrete investments, a given percentage increase in an explanatory variable may entail a smaller increase on average in the percent change in branches. This discreteness issue may also account for the smaller R 2 statistic reported for rural markets.
As noted above, all previous analyses of the extent of bank branching have employed a linear functional form in which the ratio of market branches to population serves as the dependent variable. Table 3 reports results that employ this and an equivalent functional form.
Consider first the results of estimations reported in column (1) and (2), where branches per population (br t /pop t ) serves as the dependent variable, and the sample employed contain 318 and 87 urban markets, respectively. As may be seen from the derivation of equation (1') from equation (1) above, the constant term indicates the linear part of the estimated relationship between market population and the number of branches, while the coefficient of pop mt in (1') may be seen from (1) to be that of the square of population. Thus, the negative and statistically significant coefficients of pop t-1 reported in table 3 may be interpreted to imply that, all else equal, as population in a market increases, the resulting increment in the number of branches declines. This is roughly consistent with the results presented in table 2 , which indicate that the number of branches changes by a smaller percentage than the change in population, all else equal.
Results obtained for the remaining variables are equivalent to those reported using the log-linear functional form. The coefficients of dereg t-1 are positive and highly significant, indicating again the importance of statewide branching restrictions as a determinant of the extent of branching in a market. The coefficients of assetrate t-1 are also positive and highly significant, implying that the revenue obtainable from a dollar of deposits is positively related to the extent of branching in the market in the subsequent period. As in table 2, the coefficients of hhi t-1 are negative and statistically significant, while the coefficients of inmigration t-1 are not statistically significant. As reported in column (2) for the reduced sample of 87 urban markets, the coefficient of congest t-1 is positive and significant, as predicted, although in this case it is significant at only the 10 percent level.
As noted, results presented in table 2 suggest that market income is more highly correlated with branching in the market than is market population. Consequently, the regressions reported in columns (1) and (2) of table 3 are repeated in columns (3) and (4), with the difference that market income ( t y ) replaces population both in the denominator of the dependent variable and as an explanatory variable. As indicated from the corresponding R 2 statistics, the use of market income appears to explain more of the overall within-market variation in branching.
With one exception, the coefficients obtained using market income are equivalent qualitatively to those obtained using market population. The one exception is in the coefficient of congest t-1 , which, though positive, is not statistically significant.
The final two regressions presented in columns (5) and (6) process, and it is instructive to document any association that may stem from that process.
As indicated in table 4, all coefficients of brsize t are negative and statistically significant.
Since year fixed effects are included, these detrended results suggest that those markets that experienced greater growth in branches per population or branches per real income over time also experienced greater reductions in the average size of their branches. A possible reason for this is that the labor saving impact of technological change is greater in the case of newer branches than older ones. It might also reflect the possibility that with fewer employees needed to handle the operations of a branch, a larger number of branches become desirable.
From this observed association, it is reasonable to question whether the market characteristics associated with the extent of branching, as documented in tables 2 and 3, are also associated, in the opposite direction, with the size of market branches. To investigate this, the regressions reported in table 2 were re-estimated using ln( ) t brsize as the dependent variable.
While coefficient signs do tend to be the opposite of those reported in table 2, most, particularly in the case of urban markets, are not statistically significant. The major exception in the case of urban markets are the coefficient of assetrate t-1 , which is negative and statistically significant in the case of the full sample, and the coefficients of inmigration t-1 , which are positive and statistically significant. The results obtained for rural markets provide some support for the hypothesis that market characteristics relate to branch size in the direction opposite to their relationship with market branching, since the coefficient of the lagged deregulation variable (dereg t-1 ) is negative and significant, while the coefficient of lagged concentration (
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the much discussed phenomenon of growth in the number of bank branches over time, as well as the much less discussed phenomenon of decline in the size of the average bank branch, as measured by branch employment. Our primary goal has been to outline the market characteristics associated with both of these phenomena, as well as to present what we can determine about the relationship between the two.
In addition to more commonly used data sources, we bring to these questions sources of data not typically seen in studies of the banking industry. These include data from the US Census's County Business Patterns to obtain information on the number and employment distribution of banking "establishments" by market area, data from the Internal Revenue Using a panel data set that consists of over 2,000 markets observed from 1988 to 2004
and an estimation procedure that includes both market and year fixed effects, we report a number of findings regarding the market characteristics that are associated with the number of branches in a market and the average employment size of those branches. We also report evidence regarding the detrended relationship between the number of market branches and average employment by branch.
In terms of determinants (or correlates) of the number of branches in the market, we first note that much of the frequently noted sharp increase in the number of bank branches in the US in recent years appears to result from the substitution of commercial bank branches for the branches of savings associations. To address additional factors, we estimate the relationship between market or state characteristics and the number of market branches of commercial banks and savings associations together. We report the following findings: (1) Using either market total income or market population as a measure of market size, the number of branches in a market increases, but less than proportionately, with market size. (2) Total personal income in the market appears to be much more strongly correlated with the number of market branches over time than is total population. In the case of urban markets, this is supported formally by failure to reject the hypothesis that, using a multiplicative functional form, the coefficients of the log of population and the log of income per capita are the same. No. of markets 318 87 1,897 Note: All regressions include market and year fixed effects and account for correlated errors within markets. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and the symbols +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. No. of markets 318 87 318 87 1.897 1,897 Note: All regressions include market and year fixed effects and account for correlated errors within markets. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and the symbols +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Note: All regressions include market and year fixed effects and account for correlated errors within markets. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and the symbols +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. No. of markets 318 87 1,897 Note: All regressions include market and year fixed effects and account for correlated errors within markets. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and the symbols +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
